# Treasury Repo Specials & TMPG 300-Bps Fails Penalty

> Analyze specific-issue US Treasury repo specialness, negative repo floors, fails-to-deliver, and the TMPG 300-bps settlement fail penalty charge.

Canonical: https://alphapulsefin.com/analysis/treasury-specials-repo-fails-to-deliver-tmpg-penalty-charge
Last updated: 2026-11-14T19:37:16.043Z

**Publication:** AlphaPulse Finance
**Category:** Sofr Repo Funding Liquidity
**Published:** 2026-11-14T05:00:25.915Z
**Author:** Dr. Marcus Vance, CFA (CFA, PhD in Financial Economics (Wharton))
**Reviewer:** Not recorded

## Answer-first summary

Heavy short-hedging in benchmark 10-year US Treasury notes drives specific-issue repo rates 25 to 180 bps below SOFR, bounded by the TMPG 300-bps fails penalty.

## Key takeaways

- Under TMPG rules, the explicit fail surcharge equals max(3.00% - FOMC_Lower_Bound, 0%)—guaranteeing total fail cost (explicit charge + foregone cash interest) is always >= 300 bps.
- At a 3.75% FOMC floor and 3.91% GC repo, failing to deliver already forfeits 391 bps of cash reinvestment interest, keeping specific-issue repo floored near 0.00%.
- Forty-five bps of average repo specialness over a 90-day benchmark cycle justifies ~1.4 bps of yield richening on the current 10-year note versus the "Old" 10-year.
- NY Fed noon SOMA Securities Lending swaps scarce CUSIPs against general Treasury collateral (bond-for-bond) at a >=100 bps fee, relieving squeezes without draining reserves.

## Related financial entities

- **NY Fed Primary Dealer Net Treasury Inventory Holdings** (PRIMARY-DEALER) — company: NY Fed Primary Dealer Net Treasury Inventory Holdings (PRIMARY-DEALER) refers to an institutional financial benchmark and regulatory standard monitored by NY Fed FR 2004 Survey (US), currently calibrated at $294.0B (Net Coupon Position) as of October 2026.
- **Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) Repo Benchmark** (SOFR-OVERNIGHT) — product: Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) Repo Benchmark (SOFR-OVERNIGHT) refers to an institutional financial benchmark and regulatory standard monitored by Federal Reserve Bank of New York (US), currently calibrated at 3.91% (ACT/360 Rate) as of October 2026.
- **U.S. Treasury 10-Year Benchmark Note Auction Liquidity** (UST-QRA-10Y) — product: U.S. Treasury 10-Year Benchmark Note Auction Liquidity (UST-QRA-10Y) refers to an institutional financial benchmark and regulatory standard monitored by U.S. Department of the Treasury (US), currently calibrated at 4.32% (Par Yield) as of October 2026.

## Analysis

While generic US Treasury baskets clear near **3.91%** in [Overnight SOFR](/entities/sofr-overnight-secured-overnight-financing-rate-sofr-repo-benchmark), specific-issue DVP repo rates on newly auctioned [10-Year Benchmark Notes](/entities/ust-qra-10y-u-s-treasury-10-year-benchmark-note-auction-liquidity) routinely plunge to **3.55%, 2.10%, or even negative rates (-0.85%)** right before quarterly reopenings. Known as trading **"on special,"** collateral scarcity emerges whenever corporate bond underwriters, mortgage hedgers, and macro desks establish short positions exceeding the lendable float on [Primary Dealer Balance Sheets](/entities/primary-dealer-ny-fed-primary-dealer-net-treasury-inventory-holdings)—bounded downward strictly by the Treasury Market Practices Group (TMPG) **300-bps fails-to-deliver charge**.

## How Specific-Issue Shorting Creates Negative Repo Specialness

In a short cash Treasury sale, a dealer or hedge fund sells the liquid on-the-run 10-year CUSIP today (say to hedge a $2 billion investment-grade corporate bond underwriting) and must **borrow that exact 9-character CUSIP** in reverse repo to deliver it to the buyer on T+1. Because the buyer only accepts that specific CUSIP, the short seller willingly accepts a steep discount on the cash it posts as collateral.

When aggregate short interest approaches lendable float—particularly late in an auction cycle after buy-and-hold foreign central banks and domestic mutual funds lock the CUSIP away in unlent custody—specific-issue repo falls 150 to 450 bps below general collateral (GC). Long holders who lend their on-the-run 10-year note at 1.41% specific repo and reinvest the cash proceeds at 3.91% GC pocket **+250 bps of riskless annualized "repo specialness alpha"** on top of the bond's 4.32% coupon!

![Lifecycle of on-the-run 10-year Treasury repo specialness from WI announcement to reopening relief](/api/figure?type=flow&title=10-Year%20On-the-Run%20Repo%20Specialness%20%26%20SOMA%20Lending%20Valve&subtitle=How%20corporate%20rate-lock%20shorts%20compress%20specific-issue%20repo%20rates%20until%20reopening%20supply%20arrives&steps=Corporate%20%26%20MBS%20Shorts%3A%3ADealers%20short%20%2442B%20on-the-run%2010Y%20CUSIP%20to%20hedge%20IG%20bond%20deals%7CFloat%20Lock-Up%20Squeeze%3A%3ACentral%20banks%20%26%20funds%20hold%20CUSIP%20unlent%3B%20specific%20repo%20drops%20to%202.40%25%7CNY%20Fed%20Noon%20Sec-Lending%3A%3ASOMA%20lends%20scarce%20CUSIPs%20vs%20other%20USTs%20at%20%3E%3D100%20bps%20fee%20cap%7C%2439B%20Reopening%20Relief%3A%3AMonth%2B1%20reopening%20nearly%20doubles%20float%2C%20normalizing%20repo%20spread&metrics=Avg%2010Y%20Specialness%3A%3A22-35%20bps%3A%3ASpread%20below%203.91%25%20GC%7CPre-Reopen%20Squeeze%3A%3A150%2B%20bps%3A%3APeak%20pre-auction%20scarcity%7CTotal%20Fail%20Economic%20Cost%3A%3A~391%20bps%3A%3AForegone%20GC%20cash%20interest%7CSOMA%20Min%20Lending%20Fee%3A%3A100%20bps%3A%3ABond-vs-bond%20fee%20floor)

## Why the TMPG 300-Bps Fails Floor Allows Deeply Negative Repo Rates

Before May 2009, failing to deliver a Treasury security on settlement date simply postponed payment without explicit penalty—implying a **0.00% floor** on repo rates (because if specific repo went negative, a borrower could just deliberately fail to deliver at 0% cost, creating $2.7T/week of daisy-chain fails in autumn 2008).

Sponsored by the [Federal Reserve](/regulators/u-s-federal-reserve-system-156) Bank of New York, the **TMPG Fails Charge** sets the penalty equal to **`max(3.00% - Fed_Funds_Floor, 0)`**, meaning a failing seller pays a minimum **300-bps annualized penalty** whenever the FOMC target corridor floor sits at or above 3.00%. Under an FOMC floor of **3.75%**, rather than failing and forfeiting 3.75% cash interest on delayed settlement proceeds, short sellers bid specific repo down toward **`GC - 300 bps` or `-3.00%` effective economic floor** depending on fail-claim conventions across [FINRA](/regulators/finra) and FICC DVP participants like [Cantor Fitzgerald](/institutions/cantor).

```formula
Specialness_Spread_bps = (R_GC_Repo - R_Specific_CUSIP_Repo) * 100
TMPG_Explicit_Penalty = max(0.0300 - R_FOMC_Target_Lower, 0)
Yield_Value_of_Special = (Specialness_Spread * (Days_On_Special / 360)) / ModDur_Bond

Worked 10-Year On-the-Run Specialness Yield Advantage (90-Day Cycle, Avg Specialness = 45 bps):
- Cumulative 90-Day Financing Pickup = 0.45% * (90 / 360) = +0.1125% ($0.1125 per $100 par)
- Divided by 10Y Modified Duration (8.15 yrs): Fair Yield Richening = 0.1125% / 8.15 = 1.38 bps lower yield
- Total Fail Cost Check at 3.91% GC: Failing seller loses 3.91% cash return -> repo floors near 0.00%!
```

## TMPG Fails Charge Formula & Specialness Old/New Yield Roll Value

Under official TMPG Treasury/Agency rules, the annualized fail claim rate equals `max(3% - Target_Range_Bottom, 0%)` **in addition** to the seller forfeiting time-value interest on delayed sale proceeds. Examining the exact TMPG algebra when Target Range Bottom equals 3.75% (> 3.00%) shows `max(3.00% - 3.75%, 0)` equals **0% explicit surcharge**, *because* failing to deliver already costs the seller **3.75%-3.91% of foregone overnight interest** on unpaid cash proceeds. Conversely, when policy rates were 0.00%, the explicit 3.00% charge kept total economic fail cost at or above 300 bps at all times.

![Total economic cost of failing to deliver a US Treasury across FOMC rate regimes under TMPG rules](/api/figure?type=bars&title=Total%20Economic%20Cost%20of%20a%20Treasury%20Fail-to-Deliver%20Across%20Cycles&subtitle=Foregone%20overnight%20cash%20proceeds%20plus%20explicit%20TMPG%20max%283%25%20-%20Floor%2C%200%29%20surcharge&steps=ZIRP%20Era%20%280.00%25%20Floor%29%3A%3A0%20bps%20lost%20interest%20%2B%20300%20bps%20TMPG%20charge%20%3D%20300%20bps%20floor%20%28-3%25%20repo%29%7CMid-Rate%20%281.75%25%20Floor%29%3A%3A175%20bps%20lost%20interest%20%2B%20125%20bps%20TMPG%20charge%20%3D%20300%20bps%20floor%7C2026%20Corridor%20%283.75%25%20Floor%29%3A%3A391%20bps%20lost%20GC%20cash%20interest%20%2B%200%20bps%20surcharge%20%3D%20391%20bps%20cost%7CSOMA%20Sec-Lend%20Relief%3A%3ADealer%20swaps%20GC%20UST%20for%20scarce%20CUSIP%20at%20~100-150%20bps%20fee&metrics=Old%20vs%20New%2010Y%20Roll%3A%3A%2B2.1%20bps%3A%3AYield%20discount%20for%20liquidity%7CFR%202004%20Weekly%20Fails%3A%3A~%2444.0B%3A%3ADown%2098%25%20from%202008%20peak%7CSOMA%20Per-CUSIP%20Cap%3A%3A90%25%20Float%3A%3ADaily%20noon%20lending%20limit%7CDVP%20Specials%20Trim%3A%3ABottom%2025%25%3A%3APurged%20from%20SOFR%20median)

## Lifecycle of On-the-Run Specialness & SOMA Securities Lending

To prevent chronic delivery squeezes without eliminating natural market incentives, the NY Fed operates a daily **12:00 PM ET SOMA Securities Lending** facility exclusively for the 24 primary dealers.

| Scarcity / Backstop Mechanism | Trigger / Rate Formula | Q4 2026 Calibration | Eligible Counterparties | Governance & Reporting |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Normal On-the-Run 10Y Special | GC Repo minus Scarcity Bid | 3.56% - 3.70% Repo | All FICC DVP & Bilateral | Purged from [SOFR](/entities/sofr-overnight-secured-overnight-financing-rate-sofr-repo-benchmark) (<25th Pct) |
| NY Fed SOMA Noon Sec-Lending | Bond-for-Bond Fee Auction | >= 1.00% Lending Fee | 24 Primary Dealers Only | NY Fed Desk ([Cantor](/institutions/cantor)) |
| TMPG Explicit Fails Charge | max(3.00% - Fed Floor, 0%) | 0.00% (+3.91% Lost Cash) | Market-Wide Cash & Repo | TMPG / [FINRA](/regulators/finra) / [SEC](/regulators/sec) |
| FICC Automated Pair-Off / Net | Multilateral CCP Novation | >60% Fail Reduction | FICC GSD Netting + Sponsored | DTCC FICC ([Federal Reserve](/regulators/u-s-federal-reserve-system-156)) |

## Pricing the On-the-Run vs First-Off-the-Run ("Old 10Y") Roll Spread

Why does the current on-the-run 10-year note trade 1.5 to 3.5 bps **lower in yield** (richer in price) than the "Old" 10-year note issued just three months ago? Present-valuing 90 days of expected +25 to +65 bps repo specialness advantage over an 8.15-year modified duration directly accounts for 0.8 to 2.0 bps of yield richening—creating the classic **WI-to-Old Roll** arbitrage ahead of each Quarterly Refunding Announcement.

Quantitative pods link this specification with [OFR Non-Centrally Cleared Bilateral Repo (NCCBR) Data](/analysis/ofr-non-centrally-cleared-bilateral-repo-nccbr-zero-haircuts), [Federal Reserve Discount Window Readiness](/analysis/discount-window-primary-credit-pre-positioned-collateral-haircuts), and [SOFR, Tri-Party Repo Plumbing & Primary Dealer Balance Sheets](/analysis/sofr-tri-party-repo-primary-dealer-balance-sheet-plumbing); browse [SOFR](/topics/sofr-repo-funding-liquidity) or [tracked macro entities](/entities) for live benchmarks.

## Frequently asked questions

### Why does the TMPG explicit fails charge drop to 0% when the Fed funds target range exceeds 3.00%?

A seller who fails to deliver a bond does not receive the buyer’s cash on T+1 and therefore loses overnight interest on those proceeds. Once overnight rates exceed 3.00%, lost cash interest alone already penalizes fails by >300 bps without an extra surcharge.

### How could US Treasury specific-issue repo rates turn negative (-2.50%) during 2020-2021?

When the FOMC target floor was 0.00%, lost cash interest on a fail was zero, so the explicit 3.00% TMPG penalty applied—driving desperate borrowers to accept repo rates down to -2.95% before choosing to fail at -3.00%.

### Does the NY Fed SOMA Securities Lending program lend cash or change bank reserves?

Neither. SOMA noon securities lending is strictly a bond-for-bond collateral swap: primary dealers pledge general Treasury collateral and pay a lending fee (>=100 bps) to borrow a scarce CUSIP overnight, leaving bank reserves untouched.

### Why does repo specialness usually peak the day before a 10-year reopening auction settles?

Dealers build maximum When-Issued and cash hedges right into the auction while existing $42B float is tightly held; the moment $39B of fungible reopening supply settles under the identical CUSIP, float jumps 93% and specialness collapses.


## Source URLs

- https://www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/failscharge
- https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/sec_terms
- https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/specialness-in-the-treasury-repo-market.htm

## Citation

- APA: Dr. Marcus Vance, CFA. (2026). On-the-Run Treasury Specials in Repo, Fails-to-Deliver & TMPG 300-Bps Penalty Mechanics. AlphaPulse Finance. https://alphapulsefin.com/analysis/treasury-specials-repo-fails-to-deliver-tmpg-penalty-charge
- Canonical article: [On-the-Run Treasury Specials in Repo, Fails-to-Deliver & TMPG 300-Bps Penalty Mechanics](https://alphapulsefin.com/analysis/treasury-specials-repo-fails-to-deliver-tmpg-penalty-charge)
- Site research index: [AlphaPulse Finance](https://alphapulsefin.com/llms-full.txt)
